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Abstract
The game dynamical equations are derived from Boltzmann-like equations for individual
pair interactions by assuming a certain kind of imitation behavior, the so-called propor-
tional imitation rule. They can be extended to a stochastic formulation of evolutionary
game theory which allows the derivation of approximate and corrected mean value and
covariance equations. It is shown that, in the case of phase transitions (i.e. multi-modal
probability distributions), the mean value equations do not agree with the game dynamical
equations. Therefore, their exact meaning is carefully discussed. Finally, some generaliza-
tions of the behavioral model are presented, including effects of expectations, other kinds
of interactions, several subpopulations, or memory effects.
1 Introduction
Since von Neumann and Morgenstern have initiated the field of game theory,1 it has often
proved of great value for the quantitative description and understanding of the competition
and co-operation between individuals. Game theory focusses on two questions: 1. Which
is the optimal strategy in a given situation? 2. What is the dynamics of strategy choices in
cases of repeatedly interacting individuals? In this connection game dynamical equations2
find a steadily increasing interest. Although they agree with the replicator equations of
evolution theory (cf. Sec. 2), they cannot be substantiated in the same way. Therefore,
we will be looking for a foundation of the game dynamical equations which bases on
individual actions and decisions (cf. Sec. 4).
In addition, we will formulate a stochastic version of evolutionary game theory (cf. Sec.
3). This allows to investigate the effects of fluctuations on the dynamics of social systems.
1J. von Neumann and O. Morgenstern, Theory of Games and Economic Behavior. Princeton: Princeton
University Press 1944.
2P. Taylor and L. Jonker, “Evolutionarily Stable Strategies and Game Dynamics”, in: Math. Bio-
sciences 40, 1978, pp. 145–156.
J. Hofbauer and K. Sigmund, Evolutionstheorie und dynamische Systeme. Berlin: Parey 1984.
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In order to illustrate the essential ideas, a concrete model for the self-organization of
behavioral conventions is presented (cf. Sec. 5). We will see that the game dynamical
equations describe the average evolution of social systems only for a certain time period.
Therefore, a criterium for their validity will be developed (cf. Sec. 6). Finally, we will
present possible extensions to more general behavioral models and discuss the actual
meaning of the game dynamical equations (cf. Sec. 7).
2 The Game Dynamical Equations
Let px(t) with
0 ≤ px(t) ≤ 1 and
∑
x
px(t) = 1 (1)
denote the proportion of individuals pursuing the behavioral strategy x ∈ S at time t. We
assume the considered strategies to be mutually exclusive. The set S of strategies may
be discrete or continuous, finite or infinite. The only difference will be that sums over
x are to be replaced by integrals in cases of continuous sets. By Axy we will denote the
possibly time-dependent payoff of an individual using strategy x when confronted with
an individual pursuing strategy y. Hence, his/her expected success 〈Ex〉t will be given by
the weighted mean value
〈Ex〉t =
∑
y
Axy py(t) , (2)
since py is the probability that the interaction partner uses strategy y. In addition, the
average expected success will be
〈E〉t =
∑
x
px(t)〈Ex〉t =
∑
x
∑
y
px(t)Axy py(t) . (3)
Assuming that the relative temporal increase (dpx/dt)/px of the proportion px of individ-
uals pursuing strategy x is proportional to the difference between the expected success
〈Ex〉t and the average expected success 〈E〉t, we obtain the game dynamical equations
dpx(t)
dt
= νpx(t)[〈Ex〉t − 〈E〉t]
= νpx(t)
[
〈Ex〉t −
∑
y
py(t)〈Ey〉t
]
, (4)
where the possibly time-dependent proportionality factor ν is a measure for the interac-
tion rate with other individuals. According to (4), the proportions of strategies with an
above-average success 〈Ex〉t > 〈E〉t increase, whereas the other strategies will be dimin-
ished. Note, that the proportion of a strategy does not necessarily increase or decrease
monotonically. Certain payoffs are related with an oscillatory or even chaotic dynamics3.
Equations (4) are identical with the replicator equations from evolutionary biology. They
can be extended to the selection-mutation equations
dpx(t)
dt
= νpx(t)
[
〈Ex〉t −
∑
y
py(t)〈Ey〉t
]
+
∑
y
[py(t)w1(y → x)− px(t)w1(x→ y)] . (5)
3W. Schnabl, P. F. Stadler, C. Forst, and P. Schuster, “Full Characterization of a Strage Attractor.
Chaotic Dynamics in Low-Dimensional Replicator Systems”, in: Physica D 48, 1991, pp. 65–90.
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The terms which agree with (4) describe a selection of superior strategies. The new terms
correspond to the effect of mutations, i.e. to spontaneous changes from strategy x to
other strategies y with possibly time-dependent transition rates w1(x → y) (last term)
and the inverse transitions. They allow to describe trial and error behavior or behavioral
fluctuations.
3 Stochastic Dynamics: The Master Equation
Let us consider a social system consisting of a constant number
N =
∑
x
nx(t) (6)
of individuals. Herein, nx(t) denotes the number of individuals who pursue strategy x at
time t. Hence, the time-dependent vector
~n = (n1, n2, . . . , nx, . . . , ny, . . .) (7)
reflects the strategy distribution in the social system and is called the socioconfiguration.
If the individual strategy changes are subject to random fluctuations (e.g. due to trial
and error behavior or decisions under uncertainty), we will have a stochastic dynamics.
Therefore, given a certain socioconfiguration ~n0 at time t0, for the occurence of the strategy
distribution ~n at a time t > t0 we can only calculate a certain probability P (~n, t). Its
temporal change dP/dt is governed by the so-called master equation4
dP (~n, t)
dt
=
∑
~n ′
[P (~n′, t)W (~n ′ → ~n)− P (~n, t)W (~n→ ~n ′)] . (8)
The sum over ~n ′ extends over all socioconfigurations fulfilling nx ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . .} and (6).
According to equation (8), an increase of the probability P (~n, t) of having socioconfigu-
ration ~n is caused by transitions from other socioconfigurations ~n ′ to ~n. While a decrease
of P (~n, t) is related to changes from ~n to other socioconfigurations ~n ′. The correspond-
ing changing rates are proportional to the configurational transition rates W (~n→ ~n ′) of
changes to socioconfigurations ~n ′ given the socioconfiguration ~n and to the probability
P (~n, t) of having socioconfiguration ~n at time t.
The configurational transition rates W have the meaning of transition probabilities per
time unit and must be non-negative quantities. Frequently, the individuals can be assumed
to change their strategies independently of each other. Then, the configurational transition
rates have the form
W (~n→ ~n ′) =
{
nxw(x→ y;~n) if ~n ′ = ~nxy
0 otherwise,
(9)
i.e. they are proportional to the number nx of individuals who may change their strategy
from x to another strategy y with an individual transition rate w(x → y;~n) ≥ 0. In
relation (9), the abbreviation
~nxy = (n1, n2, . . . , nx − 1, . . . , ny + 1, . . .) (10)
4W. Weidlich and G. Haag, Concepts and Models of a Quantitative Sociology. The Dynamics of In-
teracting Populations. Berlin: Springer, 1983.
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means the socioconfiguration which results after an individual has changed his/her strat-
egy from x to y.
It can be shown that the master equation has the properties
P (~n, t) ≥ 0 and ∑
~n
P (~n, t) = 1 (11)
for all times t, if they are fulfilled at some initial time t0. Therefore, the master equation
actually describes the temporal evolution of a probability distribution.
4 Approximate Mean Value Equations
In order to connect the stochastic model to the game dynamical equations, we must specify
the individual transition rates w in a suitable way. Therefore, we derive the mean value
equations related to the master equation (8) and compare them to the selection-mutation
equations (5).
The proportion px is defined as the mean value
〈f〉t =
∑
~n
f(~n, t)P (~n, t) (12)
of the number f(~n, t) = nx of individuals pursuing strategy x, divided by the total number
N of considered individuals:
px(t) =
〈nx〉t
N
=
1
N
∑
~n
nxP (~n, t) . (13)
Taking the time derivative of 〈nx〉t and inserting the master equation gives
d〈nx〉t
dt
=
∑
~n
nx[P (~n
′, t)W (~n ′ → ~n)− P (~n, t)W (~n→ ~n ′)]
=
∑
~n
(n′x − nx)W (~n→ ~n ′)P (~n, t) , (14)
where we have interchanged ~n and ~n ′ in the first term on the right hand side. Taking into
account relation (9), we get
d〈nx〉t
dt
=
∑
~nyx
nyw(y → x;~n)P (~n, t)−
∑
~nxy
nxw(x→ y;~n)P (~n, t)
=
∑
y
[nyw(y → x;~n)− nxw(x→ y;~n)]P (~n, t) . (15)
With (13) this finally leads to the approximate mean value equations
dpx(t)
dt
=
∑
y
[py(t)w(y → x; 〈~n〉t)− px(t)w(x→ y; 〈~n〉t)] (16)
However, these are only exact, if the individual transition rates w are independent of
the socioconfiguration ~n. Anyhow, they are approximately valid as long as the probability
distribution P (~n, t) is narrow, so that the mean value 〈f(~n, t)〉t of a function f(~n, t) can
4
be replaced by the function f(〈~n〉t, t) of the mean value. This problem will be discussed
in detail later on.
Comparing the rate equations (16) with the selection-mutation equations (5), we find a
complete correspondence for the case
w(y → x;~n) = w1(y → x) + w2(y → x)nx (17)
with
w2(y → x) = ν
N
max(Ex − Ey, 0) (18)
and the success
Ex =
∑
y
Axy
ny
N
, (19)
since
max(〈Ex〉t − 〈Ey〉t, 0)−max(〈Ey〉t − 〈Ex〉t, 0) = 〈Ex〉t − 〈Ey〉t . (20)
Whereas w1 is again the mutation rate (i.e. the rate of spontaneous transitions), the
additional term in (17) describes imitation processes, where individuals take over the
strategy x of their respective interaction partner. Imitation processes correspond to pair
interactions of the form
y + x→ x+ x . (21)
Their frequency is proportional to the number nx of interaction partners who may convince
an individual of strategy x. The proportionality factor w2 is the imitation rate.
Relation (18) is called the proportional imitation rule and can be shown to be the best
learning rule.5 It was discovered in 19926 and says that an imitation behavior only takes
place, if the strategy x of the interaction partner turns out to have a greater success Ex
than the own strategy y. In such cases, the imitation rate is proportional to the difference
(Ex − Ey) between the success’ of the alternative x and the previous strategy y, i.e.
strategy changes occur more often the greater the advantage of the new strategy x would
be.
All specifications of the type
w2(y → x) = C + ν
N
[λEx − (1− λ)Ey] (22)
with an arbitrary parameter λ also lead to the game dynamical equations. However,
individuals would then, with a certain rate, take over the strategy x of the interaction
partner, even if its success Ex is smaller than that of the previously used strategy y.
Moreover, if C is not chosen sufficiently large, the individual transition rates w ≥ 0 can
become negative.
In summary, we have found a microscopic foundation of evolutionary game theory which
bases on four plausible assumptions: 1. Individuals evaluate the success of a strategy
as its average payoff in interactions with other individuals (cf. (19)). 2. They compare
the success of their strategy with that of the respective interaction partner, basing on
observations or an exchange of experiences. 3. Individuals imitate each others behavior.
4. In doing so, they apply the proportional imitation rule (18) [or (22)].
5K. H. Schlag, “Why Imitate, and if so, How? A Bounded Rational Approach to Multi-Armed Bandits”,
Discussion Paper No. B-361, Department of Economics, University of Bonn.
6D. Helbing, “Interrelations between Stochastic Equations for Systems with Pair Interactions”, in
Physica A 181, 1992, pp. 29–52.
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5 Self-Organization of Behavioral Conventions
For illustrative reasons, we will now discuss an example which allows to understand how
social conventions emerge. We consider the simple case of two alternative strategies x ∈
{1, 2} and assume them to be equivalent so that the payoff matrix is symmetrical:
(
Axy
)
=
(
A+B B
B A +B
)
. (23)
If A > 0, the additional payoff A reflects the advantage of using the same strategy like the
respective interaction partner. This situation is, for example, given in cases of network
externalities like in the historical rivalry between the video systems VHS and BETA
MAX7. Finally, the mutation rates are taken constant, i.e. w1(x→ y) =W1.
The resulting game dynamical equations are
dpx(t)
dt
= −2
[
px(t)− 1
2
] {
W1 + νApx(t)[px(t)− 1]
}
. (24)
Obviously, they have only one stable stationary solution if the (control) parameter
κ = 1− 4W1
νA
(25)
is smaller than zero. However, for κ > 0 equation (24) can be rewritten in the form
dpx(t)
dt
= −2νA
[
px(t)− 1
2
] [
px(t)− 1 +
√
κ
2
] [
px(t)− 1−
√
κ
2
]
. (26)
The stationary solution px = 1/2 is unstable, then, but we have two new stable stationary
solutions px = (1/2 ±
√
κ/2). That is, dependent on the detailled initial condition, one
strategy will win the majority of users although both strategies are completely equivalent.
This phenomenon is called symmetry breaking. It will be suppressed, if the mutation rate
W1 is larger than the advantage effect νA/4.
The above model allows to understand how behavioral conventions come about. Examples
are the pedestrians’ preference for the right-hand side (in Europe), the revolution direction
of clock hands, the direction of writing, or the already mentioned triumph of the video
system VHS over BETA MAX.
It is very interesting how the above mentioned symmetry breaking affects the probability
distribution P (~n, t) = P (n1, n2, t) = P (n1, N − n1, t) of the related stochastic model
(cf. Fig. 18). For κ < 0 the probability distribution is located around n1 = N/2 = n2
and stays small so that the approximate mean value equations are applicable. At the
so-called critical point κ = 0, a phase transition to a qualitative different system behavior
occurs and the probability distribution becomes very broad. As a consequence, the game
dynamical equations do not correctly describe the temporal evolution of the mean strategy
distribution anymore.
7W. B. Arthur, “Competing Technologies, Increasing Returns, and Lock-In by Historical Events”, in
The Economic Journal 99, 1989, pp. 116–131.
8For illustrative reasons, a small number of individuals (N = 40) and a broad initial probability
distribution have been chosen. In each picture, the box is twice as high as the maximal occuring value of
the probability.
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For κ > 0, a bimodal and symmetrical probability distribution evolves. That is, the
likelihood that one of the two equivalent strategies will win through is much larger than
the likelihood to find approximately equal proportions of both strategies. At the beginning,
the initial state or maybe some random fluctuation determines, which strategy has better
chances to win. However, in the long run both strategies have exactly the same chance.
It is clear, that in such cases the game dynamical equations fail to describe the mean
system behavior (cf. Fig. 2), which would correspond to the average temporal evolution
of an ensemble of identical social systems. In cases of oscillatory or chaotic solutions of
the game dynamical equations the situation is even worse.
6 Exact, Approximate, and Corrected Mean Values
and Variances
In the last section we have seen that the approximate mean value equations
d〈nx〉t
dt
= Mx(〈~n〉t) (27)
with the so-called first jump moments
Mx(~n) =
∑
~n ′
(n′x − nx)W (~n→ ~n ′) (28)
(cf. (14)) are not sufficient. This calls for corrected mean value equations and a criterium
for the time period of their validity. If the individual transition rates w(x→ y;~n) depend
on the socioconfiguration, the exact mean value can only be evaluated via formula (13).
This requires the calculation of the probability distribution P (~n, t) and, therefore, the
numerical solution of the respective master equation (8). Since the number of possible
socioconfigurations is normally very large, an extreme amount of computer time would
be necessary for this.
Luckily, it is possible to derive from (14) the corrected mean value equations
∂〈nx〉t
∂t
= Mx(〈~n〉t) + 1
2
∑
y
∑
y′
σyy′(t)
∂2Mx(〈~n〉t)
∂〈ny〉t∂〈ny′〉t (29)
by means of a suitable Taylor approximation. This equation depends on the covariances
σxy(t) =
〈
(nx − 〈nx〉t)(ny − 〈ny〉t)
〉
t
=
∑
~n
(nx − 〈nx〉t)(ny − 〈ny〉t)P (~n, t) (30)
which can be determined by means of the covariance equations
∂σxx′(t)
∂t
= Mxx′(〈~n〉t) + 1
2
∑
y
∑
y′
σyy′(t)
∂2Mxx′(〈~n〉t)
∂〈ny〉t∂〈ny′〉t
+
∑
y
[
σxy(t)
∂Mx′(〈~n〉t)
∂〈ny〉t + σx
′y(t)
∂Mx(〈~n〉t)
∂〈ny〉t
]
. (31)
The functions
Mxy(~n) =
∑
~n ′
(n′x − nx)(n′y − ny)W (~n→ ~n ′) (32)
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are called the second jump moments.
Equations (29) and (31) build a closed system of equations, but still no exact one, since
this would depend on higher moments of the form 〈nxnynz · · ·〉t. Nevertheless, according
to Figure 2 the corrected mean value equations yield significantly better results than
the approximate ones. As a consequence, they are valid for a much longer time period.
Suitable validity criteria are the relative variances
Vx(t) :=
σxx(t)
(〈nx〉t)2 , (33)
since these are a measure for the relative width of the probability distribution P (~n, t).
It can be shown that the covariances and all higher moments are small, if only Vx(t) is
much smaller than 1 for every x. Numerical investigations indicate that the approximate
mean value equations begin to separate from the exact ones as soon as one of the rela-
tive variances Vx(t) becomes greater than 0.04. The corrected mean value equations and
covariances remain reliable as long as Vx(t) is smaller than 0.12 for all x (cf. Fig. 2).
A more detailled discussion of the above matter is presented elsewhere9.
7 Diverse Generalizations
The above discussed behavioral model can be generalized in different respects.
Modified transition rates: The strange cusp at n1 = N/2 in Figure 1, which comes
from the discontinuous derivative of w2(x → y) at Ex = Ey, can be avoided by the
modified imitation rates
w2(y → x) = ν
N
exp(Ex −Ey)
Dxy
with Dxy = Dyx = 2 . (34)
This ansatz agrees with relation (22) in linear approximation for C = ν/(2N) and λ = 1/2,
but it always yields non-negative imitation rates. Similar to (18) it guarantees two essential
things: 1. The imitation rate grows with an increasing gain (Ex−Ey) of success. 2. If the
alternative strategy x is inferior, the imitation rate is very small (but, due to uncertainty,
not negligible). The results of the corresponding stochastic behavioral model are presented
in Figure 3. They show the usual flatness of the probability distribution P (n1, N − n1, t)
at the critical point κ = 0, where again a phase transition occurs.
Dynamics with expectations: The decisions of individuals are often influenced by
their expectations 〈Ex〉∗t′ about the success of a strategy x at future times t′ > t. These
will base on some kind of extrapolation of past experiences with the success of x. If
expected payoffs at future times t′ are weighted exponentially with their distance (t′ − t)
from the present time t, one would set10
〈Ex〉t = 1
T
∞∫
t
dt′ 〈Ex〉∗t′ exp
(
t′ − t
T
)
. (35)
9D. Helbing, “A Stochastic Behavioral Model and a ‘Microscopic’ Foundation of Evolutionary Game
Theory”, in Theory and Decision 40, 1996, pp. 149–179.
10N. S. Glance and B. A. Huberman, “Dynamics with Expectations”, in Physics Letters A 165, 1992,
pp. 432–440.
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Other kinds of pair interactions: Apart from imitative behavior, individuals also
sometimes show an avoidance behavior
x+ x→ y + x , (36)
especially if they dislike their interaction partner (so-called ‘snob effect’). This can be
taken into account by an additonal contribution to the individual interaction rates:
w(y → x;~n) = w1(y → x) + w2(y → x)nx + w3(y → x)ny . (37)
w3 denotes the avoidance rate.
Several subpopulations: Sometimes one has to distinguish different subpopulations a,
i.e. different kinds of individuals. This is necessary, if not all individuals have the same
set S of strategies.11 A similar thing holds, if the considered social system consists of
competing groups, where only individuals of the same group behave cooperatively. The
generalized behavioral equations are12
dpax(t)
dt
=
∑
y
[pay(t)w
a(y → x; 〈~n〉t)− pax(t)wa(x→ y; 〈~n〉t)] (38)
with individual interaction rates of the form
wa(y → x;~n) = wa1(y → x) +
∑
b
[wab2 (y → x)nbx + wab3 (y → x)nby] . (39)
Inclusion of memory effects: If the strategy distribution at past times t′ < t influ-
ences present decisions in a non-Markovian way, the approximate mean value equations
have the form
dpax(t)
dt
=
∑
y
t∫
−∞
dt′ [pay(t
′)wat−t′(y → x; 〈~n〉t′)− pax(t′)wat−t′(x→ y; 〈~n〉t′)] . (40)
For example, in cases of an exponentially decaying memory one would have
wat−t′(x→ y; 〈~n〉t′) = wa(x→ y; 〈~n〉t′)
1
τ
exp
(
t− t′
τ
)
. (41)
8 Summary and Conclusions
We have found a microscopic foundation of the game dynamical equations, basing on a
certain kind of imitative behavior. Moreover, a stochastic version of evolutionary game
theory has been formulated. It allowed to understand the self-organization of social con-
ventions as a phase transition which is related with symmetry breaking. Moreover, we have
11J. Hofbauer and K. Sigmund, The Theory of Evolution and Dynamical Systems. Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press 1988.
12D. Helbing, Quantitative Sociodynamics. Stochastic Methods and Models of Social Interaction Pro-
cesses. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic 1995.
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seen that the game dynamical equations correspond to approximate mean value equations.
Normally, they agree with the mean value equations of stochastic game theory for a cer-
tain time period only, which can be determined by calculating the relative variances. For
an improved description of the average system behavior we have derived corrected mean
value equations which require the solution of additional covariance equations.
The interpretation of the game dynamical equations follows by reformulating these in
terms of a social force model,13 assuming a continuous strategy set:
dxα(t)
dt
= f1(xα) +
∑
β(6=α)
f2(xα, xβ) + fluctuations . (42)
The force term
f1(xα) =
∫
dx (x− xα)w1(xα → x) (43)
delineates spontaneous strategy changes by individual α, whereas
f2(xα, xβ) = (xβ − xα)w2(xα → xβ)
+
∫
dx (x− xα)w3(xα → x) δ(xα − xβ) (44)
is the interaction force which originates from individual β and influences individual α.
Here, δ(x−y) denotes Dirac’s delta function (which yields a contribution for x = y only).
According to (42), the game dynamical equations describe the most probable strategy
changes rather than the average (representative) evolution of a social system. Therefore,
they neglect the effects of fluctuations on the system behavior.
A more detailled discussion of the results presented in this paper is available elsewhere12,13.
13D. Helbing, Stochastische Methoden, nichtlineare Dynamik und quantitative Modelle sozialer Prozesse,
2nd edition. Aachen: Shaker 1996.
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Figure 1: Probability distribution P (~n, t) = P (n1, N − n1; t) of the socioconfiguration ~n
for varying values of the control parameter κ according to the stochastic version of the
game dynamical equations.
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Figure 2: The numerical solutions of the approximate mean value equations (· · ·) agree
with those of the exact mean value equations (—) only for a short time interval. The
corrected mean value equations (– –) yield much better results, although they also deviate
from the exact curves when the relative variances (- - -) become too large. Nevertheless,
they describe the average long-term behavior properly.
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Figure 3: Probability distribution P (~n, t) = P (n1, N − n1; t) of the socioconfiguration ~n
according to the modified stochastic game dynamical equations.
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